- At which point in the shechitah must פירכוס take place?
The Gemara records three opinions regarding when the פירכוס – limb jerking must take place to validate the shechitah of a מסוכנת. (1) Rav Chisda relates a tradition that it must occur at the “end” of shechitah, which he interprets to mean באמצע שחיטה – during the shechitah, but פירכוס at the initial stage of shechitah would be insufficient. (2) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak says it can occur even בתחלת שחיטה – at the beginning of the shechitah. He supports this from the Mishnah’s ruling that if one shechted at night, and found the walls of the cut neck full of blood, the shechitah is valid because the animal certainly “spouted” blood, a sign of vitality. Since this may have occurred at the beginning of shechitah, this proves that even פירכוס during the beginning of shechitah suffices. (3) Rava says פירכוס must take place בסוף שחיטה – at the end of shechitah.
- An animal whose mother dies as it is born is disqualified as a korban
Rava brings proof that פירכוס must occur at the end of shechitah. A Baraisa darshens several phrases to disqualify certain animals as korbanos. Among them, "כי יולד" – when it is born פרט ליוצא דופן – excludes an animal born by caesarean section, and "תחת אמו" – under its mother פרט ליתום – excludes an orphan, i.e., an animal whose mother died. This cannot mean to disqualify an animal whose mother died after its birth; לעולם תיחי ותיזיל – must [the mother] go on living forever for its child to be a valid korban? If it died before birth and the animal was removed, it is already excluded as a יוצא דופן. Rather, the case must be where זה פירש למיתה וזה פירש לחיים – this [mother] left the world for death, and this [fetus] left the womb for life, i.e., the mother died at the birth, and the “orphan” never coexisted with its mother. Now, if we do not require חיותא בסוף לידה – vitality at the end of birth, and the passuk is only excluding where the mother died during the birth, it is already excluded as a יוצא דופן!? Rather, the vitality required must continue at the end of birth (and a moment beyond), and the same applies to shechitah.
- Shechting on behalf of an idolator (disqualifying intent of an owner)
The next Mishnah states that if one shechts an animal for an idolator, the Tanna Kamma says the shechitah is valid. Rebbe Eliezer says it is always invalid, שסתם מחשבת עובד כוכבים לעבודת כוכבים – because the unexpressed intent of an idolator is assumed to be for idolatry, and the owner’s idolatrous intent disqualifies the shechitah. Rebbe Yose argues that the owner’s intent is immaterial, based on a kal vachomer: if regarding kodashim, where improper intent invalidates, אין הכל הולך אלא אחר העובד – everything follows only the intent of the one performing the avodah (in Rebbe Yose’s opinion), then regarding chullin, where improper intent does not disqualify, certainly only the slaughterer’s intent matters. The Gemara explains that the first two Tannaim hold like Rebbe Eliezer bar Rebbe Yose, who said: שמעתי שהבעלים מפגלין – I heard that a korban’s owners can make it piggul through their intent. Thus, the Tanna Kamma agrees with Rebbe Eliezer that if the idolator expressly declared the shechitah to be for idolatry, it is disqualified; however, his unexpressed intent is not assumed to be for idolatry. Rebbe Eliezer holds his intent is automatically assumed to be for idolatry. Rebbe Yose holds that the owner’s intent is irrelevant. An alternate explanation of the machlokes is given.